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Abstract: In this essay I take up Plato’s critique of poetry, which has little to do with 
epistemology and representational imitation, but rather the powerful effects that poetic 
performances can have on audiences, enthralling them with vivid image-worlds and 
blocking the powers of critical refl ection. By focusing on the perceived psychological 
dangers of poetry in performance and reception, I want to suggest that Plato’s critique 
was caught up in the larger story of momentous shifts in the Greek world, turning on 
the rise of literacy and its far-reaching effects in modifying the original and persisting 
oral character of Greek culture. The story of Plato’s Republic in certain ways suggests 
something essential for comprehending the development of philosophy in Greece 
(and in any culture, I would add): that philosophy, as we understand it, would not have 
been possible apart from the skills and mental transformations stemming from educa-
tion in reading and writing; and that primary features of oral language and practice 
were a signifi cant barrier to the development of philosophical rationality (and also 
a worthy competitor for cultural status and authority). Accordingly, I go on to argue 
that the critique of writing in the Phaedrus is neither a defense or orality per se, nor a 
dismissal of writing, but rather a defense of a literate soul over against orality and the 
indiscriminate exposure of written texts to unworthy readers.
In my 1990 book, Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths, I examined the complex relationships between muthos and logos in Greek thought, from Homer 
to Aristotle. Inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger, my aim was to challenge the 
“progressive” view that philosophical reason displaced and corrected the early 
Greek dependence on myth and poetry. Myths never disappeared in Greek thought, 
not even in philosophy, and the supposed “correction” was in many respects 
rigged according to extra-mythical assumptions that suppressed the kind of truth 
presented in mythopoetic disclosure. Plato, of course, was a central fi gure in my 
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analysis, especially because of his ambiguous battle with the poets and poetry. I 
made brief mention of how the rise of literacy functioned in the development of 
philosophy and its implicit shift from the oral base of Greek poetry. Since 1990 I 
have become convinced that the transition from orality to discourse informed by 
writing and reading can be seen as the guiding thread throughout the rich history 
of Greek myth and philosophy. In this essay, I want to retrieve my discussion of 
Plato, now with a sharper focus on the orality-literacy question.
Plato and Myth
Greek philosophy was born as a departure from traditional forms of understand-
ing in myth and poetry. Although never completely breaking with tradition, 
philosophical modes of rationality began to contest the stories of gods and heroes 
that shaped the early Greek world. This contest reached a climax in the dialogues 
of Plato. Yet Plato’s frequent deployment of myths and the narrative form of his 
writings signifi cantly complicate the story at hand. So much so that some inter-
preters challenge the standard reading of Plato as a staunch opponent of myth 
and poetry and a proponent of fi xed metaphysical doctrines.1 I believe that Plato 
was serious in his deployment of myth, which provided a vital supplement to 
rational analysis, and even served to delimit the reach and results of philosophi-
cal thought. Yet I also believe that Plato was serious when he targeted poetry and 
myth as obstacles to philosophical wisdom. Am I confused?
The critique of poetry in the Republic had nothing to do with “aesthetics” or a 
censorship of “the arts.” Greek poetry was not an “art form” but a world-disclosive 
source of meaning for the Greeks, and in Plato’s day epic and tragic poetry were 
still primary vehicles for cultural bearings and education. Plato’s critique had to 
do with truth, the transmission of cultural values, and pedagogical authority. He 
was waging a momentous diaphora, or contest (607b), against established mean-
ings on behalf of new standards of truth and morality. So Plato’s philosophy was 
not averse to myth and poetry per se—since the dialogues were often informed 
by such things—but to traditional myth and poetry.
Plato’s critique of traditional poetry was fundamental because it challenged 
both the material and formal elements at the heart of epic narratives and tragic 
drama. The material element can be summed up as the depiction of a tragic world-
view; the formal element can be located in the psychological features of poetry’s 
composition, performance, and reception—each of which involved forces that 
surpassed conscious control and blocked critical refl ection. For Plato, the formal 
and material essence of traditional poetry represented a powerful, ingrained, 
cultural barrier that had to be overcome to clear the ground for two new ideals: 
rational inquiry and an overarching justice governing the world and the soul.
Orality, Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry 321
Epic and tragic poetry presented a world that is unstable, unpredictable, mys-
terious, and fatally ruinous of human possibilities. Here mortality is the baseline 
limit of life and death is portrayed as repulsive in its darkness (Republic 386–392). 
The poets tell “false stories” (pseudeis muthous), where heroes come to grief and 
surrender to powerful emotions, where the gods act immorally, fi ght each other, 
cause evil and ruin, punish the innocent, change form, disguise themselves, and lie 
(377–386). One thinks of Oedipus as the paradigm case of tragic life: a noble man 
faced with a terrible fate, who resists out of moral motives, and yet in this very resis-
tance actualizes his fate.2 One might also think of Socrates in this vein, a man who 
compares himself to a tragic hero (Phaedo 115a), and who is destroyed following 
a divine calling to practice philosophy. The Republic displays a wealth of meanings, 
but I think that the dialogue is essentially an anti-tragic muthos (a term applied 
to the account of the polis at 376d). The full course of the dialogue can be called a 
narrative about the possibility and desirability of a just life in a world that resists 
justice.3 That the poets and their tragic stories fi gure prominently at both ends of 
the dialogue cannot be an accident. Traditional myths were fully expressive of the 
obstacles blocking the path of Socrates’ mission. Plato wants to tell a better story 
than the poets, one that can overcome the possible tragedy of a just life. And one 
cannot help but remember the fate of Socrates, whose death at the hands of Athens 
would be tragic without the kind of rectifi cation suggested in the Republic.
The formal element in Plato’s critique concerns the psychological structure 
of poetic production, performance, and reception. The traditional view was that 
poets were inspired receptacles for the sacred power of the Muses, a “revelation” 
more than a “creation” (see the Prologue to Hesiod’s Theogony 98–108). Plato 
agreed that a poet is “not in his senses but is like a fountain giving free course to 
the water that keeps fl owing on” (Laws 719c). This matter of absorption in a force 
beyond the conscious mind was also implicated in the objections to mimēsis in 
the Republic. In Greek, mimēsis referred not only to representational likeness but 
also to psychological identifi cation in poetic performance and audience reception, 
where actors, reciters, and listeners were “taken over” by the poetic imagery and its 
emotional force.4 References to mimēsis in acting and spoken performance can be 
found in Ion 533–537, and Sophist 267.5 What really mattered to Plato in the Repub-
lic was not mimetic representation, because the example of painting is described 
as merely an analogy for the genuine matter of concern, mimetic identifi cation 
with poetic language (603c). And Socrates confesses (605c) that even the “best of 
us” can become enchanted by poetry and swept away by the pleasure of empathic 
union with the sufferings of tragic characters—an effect that ruins the “manly” 
ideal of silencing and mastering grief (605e). In Books 2 and 3, the censoring of 
poetry was qualifi ed and seemed restricted to the context of educating children. 
But later, poetry’s power threatens the refl ective mental control of sophisticated 
adults as well, and for this reason all mimetic poetry (epic and tragic) are to be 
322 Lawrence J. Hatab
banned from the ideal polis (595a). The only forms of poetry permitted are hymns 
to the gods and songs praising good men (607a–b).6
With the focus on the perceived psychological dangers of poetry in perfor-
mance and reception, I want to suggest that Plato’s critique was caught up in the 
larger story of momentous shifts in the Greek world, turning on the rise of literacy 
and its far-reaching effects in modifying the original and persisting oral character 
of Greek culture. The story of Plato’s Republic in certain ways suggests something 
essential for comprehending the development of philosophy in Greece (and in 
any culture, I would add): that philosophy, as we understand it, would not have 
been possible apart from the skills and mental transformations stemming from 
education in reading and writing; and that primary features of oral language and 
practice were a signifi cant barrier to the development of philosophical rationality 
(and also a worthy competitor for cultural status and authority).7
Orality and Literacy
Writing is far from simply the transfer of spoken words to graphic signs. If it were, 
we could not account for the far greater diffi culty in learning to read and write, 
compared to natural language acquisition. There are many different ways to dis-
tinguish the nature and effects of writing from language confi ned to oral speech.8 
Oral language is primarily the province of hearing sounds, while writing turns to 
the seeing of words in a material medium. Accordingly, oral speech is exclusively 
temporal and memorial; the passing of sounds means that memory is the only 
source of preservation. Writing provides a material presence for words and a fi xed 
structure of spatial relations, so that now language can “stand” as a permanent 
reference for memory and inspection. Because of the malleability of memory, oral 
speech, especially in poetic performance, is inevitably modifi ed in each re-telling, 
while writing permits the repetition of a fi xed content for each reading.
Oral language lives through embodied speech and reception, where tone, 
gesture, rhythm, emphasis, and facial expressions are essential to disclosive ef-
fects. Writing transforms language into disembodied graphic signs composed 
of alphabetic lines, which provides a disengagement from the animated milieu 
of conversation and face to face speech. For this reason orality is infused with 
existential contexts of lived scenarios, both in the content of poetic narratives and 
the specifi c circumstance of poetic performances before particular audiences. 
Written language becomes decontextualized in this respect. Partly because of the 
embodied, sensuous character of oral speech and the need to “draw” audiences 
to the temporal fl ux of language in immediate circumstances, “artistic” elements 
of enchanting imagery, rhythm, and musicality are essential to oral performance 
and reception.9 With writing, the text persists right before one’s eyes, lessening 
the need for an emotional lure and creating the space for detached attention.
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Writing makes possible a wide array of refl ective practices that are essential for 
philosophical thinking and that at best are unlikely to arise or fl ourish in an oral 
culture. While orality is constrained by immediate performances and the limited 
power of memory, writing offers a fi xed text that can be revisited and critically 
scanned, which opens up attention to structured relationships, signs of consis-
tency and inconsistency, and especially the shape of a whole text organized into 
parts. In this way the sense of a formal structure distinct from content is drawn 
out of language for the fi rst time.10 The range of intellectual discoveries in Greek 
thought—from mathematics to analytical atomism to metaphysics—cannot be 
understood apart from graphic and alphabetic fi guration.11
Most remarkable, I think, is the capacity for abstraction that emerges from 
writing. Oral speech is thoroughly concrete in its embodied milieu, the specifi c 
contexts of speech acts, the sensuous imagery, and the direct immersion in im-
mediate descriptions and references. In the conversion of speech into written 
words, the graphics of alphabetic lines creates a radically different presence. The 
visual markings that make up t-r-e-e are utterly arbitrary in the sense of being 
nothing like the voiced word in its context of use. Instead of talking about trees in 
concrete situations, we now see this talk separated from contexts, and what we see 
is not a tree but a visual object utterly unlike a tree or any other sensuous thing 
in experience. But a link with actual speech acts is retained, and once reading 
and writing become second nature, we develop a new way of accessing the world 
through the nonsensuous visual presence of alphabetic lines. I want to suggest 
that the power of abstraction emerges by way of this technological transforma-
tion of speech. The written word “tree” itself has no concrete features other than 
its “abstract” graphic form in a material medium. And as Bruno Snell has argued, 
the function of the defi nite article in Greek language made it possible to create 
abstract substantives out of concrete nouns, adjectives, and verbs: not “Look at 
the tree over there,” but “the tree,” everything that makes up “treeness” in general; 
and “justice” as “the just,” that which is just in general, where the modifi er “just” 
is converted into a subject of modifi cation (ta dikē). 12 Is it the visual graphics of 
writing that creates a “concrete universal,” an accessible presence stripped of all 
specifi city, which nevertheless points back to specifi c instances now “re-formed” 
in abstract terms? If true, this would help explain something that has always 
puzzled me: Plato and Aristotle deployed terms with original meanings of visual 
perception—idea, eidos, theōria—to denote conceptual forms and powers of 
intelligibility that presumably exceed or transcend sense perception—cf. Republic 
507b: the true being of each thing is its idea, which is thought (noeisthai) but not 
seen (horasthai). In Plato’s dialogues, a sensuous eidos can provide an analogical 
gateway to philosophical refl ection, as in frequent references to craft, but a true 
eidos can only be ascertained by a qualitatively different kind of intellectual “vi-
sion.” We might well wonder what Aristotle meant when he said that nonmaterial 
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form is a “look disclosed in speech” (to eidos to kata ton logon) (Physics 193a31). 
Was it the written word that made possible the abstract “look” of ideas and the 
revolutionary construction of the “mind’s eye”?13
The questions at hand suggest a tempting provocation: that the philosophical 
deployment of vision words to render abstract concepts was not a case of mere 
metaphorical transfer from visual sensation, but rather a new kind of actual 
vision of the abstract lines of meaning-laden written words. Since literacy pro-
vided such radically new openings for thought, Greek philosophers were likely 
so enthralled by these new possibilities as to be less prone to refl exive awareness 
of the graphic medium at work in philosophical thinking. Yet there are hints of 
such awareness, as we will see.
Plato and the Written Word
One thing is clear: Plato was a brilliant philosophical writer. And given the preced-
ing analysis it seems evident that literacy played a crucial role in the development 
of philosophy. Yet Plato’s dialogues exhibit an ambiguity about writing and its 
value relative to living speech. For one thing the dialogue form represents a kind 
of writing that retains the milieu of conversation as its subject.14 Also the Phaedrus 
contains a specifi c critique of writing, which I will get to shortly. I think Plato does 
give a certain priority to living dialogue, but recalling his concerns about the ef-
fects of poetry, the dialogical ideal is not a defense or retrieval of orality per se. 
The kind of philosophical dialogue promoted by Plato requires, I think, literate 
participants. And there are a number of references to writing in the dialogues 
that lead me to this view.
Yet again, the picture is not entirely clear. In the Republic, there is no specifi c 
mention of educating citizens in reading and writing. There is a consensus, though, 
that the composition of the Republic and the establishment of Plato’s Academy were 
close together in time.15 The Academy certainly used books for instruction, but it 
should be mentioned that in Plato’s day the common practice was to read books 
aloud to an audience, rather than reading in private; yet silent reading was in fact 
practiced at the time.16 At the same time, mathematical education, so important 
to Plato, required the careful study and analysis of graphic representations.17 As 
far as the dialogues are concerned, it is in the Laws that reading and writing are 
specifi cally mandated for education (810–813).
One other effect of writing should be introduced: the capacity for individu-
alized and internalized refl ection made possible by books, which are portable 
and separable from public speech acts that are socially informed and externally 
directed. Adding my previous point about the abstract “look” of written words, 
which permits the refl ective alteration of language into new conceptual forms, 
perhaps certain passages in the dialogues can be clarifi ed by way of the connec-
tions between reading, abstraction, and internalization.
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In the Philebus (38e–39b), memory and perception are compared to writ-
ing (graphein) words (logos) in the soul. Knowledge is written in the soul in the 
manner of a book (biblion). This account is preceded by the picture of a solitary 
soul, and its self-possession of thought prior to verbalizing aloud to others in 
spoken conversations. This fi ts many references in the dialogues to the soul’s 
interior possession of ideas. The Theaetetus (189e–190a) describes thinking as 
the soul’s logos and conversation (dialegesthai) with itself, a logos not spoken aloud 
to another person, but “silently to itself ” (sigē pros auton). And in the Protagoras 
(347c–348e), Socrates advocates the self-suffi ciency of relying on one’s own voice 
in a conversation. In general terms, given that selfhood in epic poetry showed 
itself to be externalized, decentralized, and subjected to fate,18 Plato advances a 
complete departure from this complex by describing the soul in terms of inter-
nality, unity, and self-mastery (Republic 443c–e).
This leads me to think that Plato’s dialectical model of philosophy is not radi-
cally dialogical (in the sense of an irreducible intersubjective practice), that good 
results and participation in a conversation involve the importing or possession 
of refl ective insight, something made possible by the technology and practice 
of writing (which would explain the metaphorical use of writing to describe 
knowledge in the soul).19
The Phaedrus, of course, complicates my argument because of its overt 
criticism of writing in favor of living speech. But let’s look carefully at the text. 
Early on, Socrates confesses to preferring life in the city because he “loves learn-
ing” (philomathēs), which cannot be found in the country. He can be coaxed to 
leave the city if lured by logous en bibliois, “discourse in books” (230d–e). When 
Socrates tries to compete with Lysias’s written speech about love, he does poorly 
and regrets his performance: he slipped into poetic modes of speech and ecstatic 
states of mind, in part because of enchantment at the physical presence of the 
beautiful Phaedrus (234d, 238e). The move to cover his head attests to Socrates’ 
worry about the effects of embodied speech (and anticipates the later picture of 
the soul needing to control the force of the body). The implication here is that 
pure orality cannot be the solution to the coming concerns about writing.
Writing is not intrinsically problematic, but it is capable of serving deceptive 
rhetorical practices (267a ff.). In fact books on speeches provide guidance for the 
proper structure and function of speech writing (266d), which should possess 
the dunamis to “guide the soul” (271c–d). And the story about King Thamus and 
the god Theuth with respect to writing is prefaced by the task of discerning good 
from bad writing (274b).
Then comes the critique of writing (274 e ff.), which is called a pharmakon 
(with ambiguous connotations of a potion, a medicine, and a poison). A reliance 
on writing diminishes the skills of memory, and most importantly, writing involves 
“external” signs belonging to others rather than an internal possession. Writing 
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provides only the appearance of wisdom since it is external to the direct access 
to knowledge. Once written down, words become dead and mute; they cannot 
answer questions or defend themselves. Moreover, recorded words can circulate 
everywhere, indiscriminately to the able and unable alike.20
In an interesting passage, the logos (word or speech) that is superior to writing 
is “written” (graphetai) in the soul of the learner, and can both defend itself and dis-
tinguish proper from improper recipients (276a). Here we also hear of the contrast 
between the inferior “sowing” of words by pen and ink and a superior form of dialectic, 
which plants and sows in the soul the words of knowledge that can also be reproduced 
in others (this seems less like a “dialogue” and more like an “infusion”).21
Then the proper writing of speeches is described as being concerned with 
truth and deploying the procedures of defi nition, analysis, division, and collection 
(all literate skills, it seems to me).22 Something like Plato’s dialogues themselves 
would seem to be exemplary here, and indeed philosophy is associated with the 
best kind of written logos (277b–278e). Any writing for “public” speeches is not 
worthy of serious attention. What is worthy are words “truly written in the soul,” 
marked by a “clear and perfect” internal understanding of goodness and justice, 
which then becomes ready for planting in other souls (278a–b).23 A case can be 
made that Plato’s dialogues were not meant to be “published” in our sense of the 
term (for an open market of readers), but rather were used for the pedagogical 
purpose of philosophical education in the Academy, where the texts were recited, 
read, studied, and discussed, with the aim of continuing intellectual exploration 
and composition.24 This might provide telling clues about why the dialogues 
exhibit an open and “unfi nished” character.
I think that the ambiguous treatment of writing in the Phaedrus can be sorted 
out by way of the tension between written texts themselves and the intellectual 
effects made possible by literacy. The dialogue raises the problem of the detach-
ability of written words from the milieu of lived speech. But this does not amount 
to a defense or retrieval of oral language per se, given the persistent criticisms 
in several dialogues of the oral power of poetry and political rhetoric to over-
whelm the mind (and Socrates’ own confession of the failure of his oration in 
the Phaedrus). Rather, it seems to me that the critique of writing amounts to the 
defense of the knowing literate soul over against 1) the stand-alone character of 
a written text, apart from the living reality of knowledge, and 2) the sterility of 
writing when not originating from, or addressed to, those select souls who pos-
sess or are capable of possessing knowledge.
The complex question of the written word in relation to genuine knowl-
edge—and of the status of the written dialogues—can perhaps be illuminated 
by attention to the Seventh Letter. The distance between writing and the original 
experience of living thought can mark the difference between an author’s authentic 
vision of reality and its transmission into and by a written text, which is judged 
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defi cient in two senses: 1) public dissemination permits access for unworthy 
readers; 2) even worthy readers cannot fathom the full vision of reality inevi-
tably concealed by written expression. The Phaedrus clearly speaks to the fi rst 
defi ciency: A written book is helpless without its “father” (the author) when it is 
released to the public and misused or reviled by the wrong kind of readers (275e). 
The second defi ciency is implicitly at issue, I think, in the Phaedrus but is clearly 
explicated in the Seventh Letter. There Plato tells us that his teachings cannot be 
captured in written texts (341–342). Words are insuffi cient for conveying genuine 
knowledge that “fl ashes” in the soul after sustained discussion between teacher 
and student (341d). In the fi ve steps of discovery (342), the soul’s knowledge of 
true objects is beyond both words and images (a cited example of an image is the 
visual fi gure of a circle). No wise person would express his deepest thoughts in 
words, in either spoken words or especially the “unchangeable” form of written 
words (343). So language as such cannot do justice to true knowledge. Verbal 
names (and their extension in defi nitions) are arbitrary and variable signs that 
do not convey the eternal nature of true objects. Even the fi xed form of written 
signs does not provide suffi cient fi rmness or certainty (343b: mēden hikanōs 
bebaiōs) because graphic lines are tainted by matter and thus they mislead the 
soul with a false permanence.25
The danger of putting thoughts into words and writing is as follows: confi ning 
knowledge to the misplaced concreteness of defective images and verbal forms 
permits endless disputation about the different aspects and permutations of the 
“relative” nature of specifi ed signs and their reciprocal heterogeneity. Such disputes 
are falsely assumed to engage the “soul of the writer” (hē psuchē tou grapsantos: 
343d). Nevertheless, genuine knowledge can emerge from earnest instruction in 
language and writing, but only with a leap beyond language that fl ashes in the soul, 
and only in the chastened milieu of intimate teacher-student exchanges, not the 
unseemly arena of envy and discord in a public readership. What is most serious 
and worthy in someone’s work cannot be found in books but in the treasured do-
main of the soul, “stored in the fairest place he possesses” (ketai de pou en chōra 
tē kallistē tō toutou: 344c). Knowledge cannot be fully realized in vocal utterances 
(phōnais) or in physical fi gures (sōmatōn schēmasin) but in souls (342c).
In closing, let me try to sort out the complicated relationships between language, 
writing, and knowledge in Plato’s texts by way of the following summary claims: 
1) Traditional poetry and its oral reception are obstacles to genuine knowledge. 
2) Knowledge can be gained through philosophical methods made possible by lit-
eracy. 3) Philosophical education proceeds through conversations between literate 
participants. 4) Such conversations can be represented and facilitated by written 
dialogues. 5) In the process of philosophical education, knowledge can dawn in the 
soul, an illumination prepared by, but leaping beyond, rational discourse. 6) The 
living process of discovery and the intrinsic limits of language are appropriately 
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presented in dialogues that are “open” in both form and content, and that partly 
deploy mythopoetic supplements to, and constraints on, rational discourse. 7) 
Philosophical dialogues are primarily geared toward pedagogy, and are suitable 
only for the right kind of audience, one that is capable of philosophical learning and 
attuned with humility and reverence for the transcendent aims of philosophy. 8) 
Written texts must be protected from the misuses and abuses that follow indiscrimi-
nate publication, and thus must be restricted to the proper milieu of instruction. 
9) Genuine knowledge is made possible by literate dialogue but is consummated 
in the leap of the soul’s “inward vision” that cannot be directly communicated. 10) 
Philosophical writing embodies a complex set of forces that both displaces and 
transforms traditional poetic language, in the direction of a rational discourse that 
breaks out into an “inspired,” receptive vision (the difference between poetry and 
philosophy is that poetry begins in inspiration and philosophy end in it).
In this rich array of forces, writing exhibits an essential ambiguity in being 
both 1) an empowerment of philosophy over the impediment of oral poetry, and 
2) an impediment to the ultimate aims of philosophy. Such ambiguity may help us 
understand the way in which writing is both critiqued and sustained in the Pha-
edrus: the move from knowledge written on the page and performed on the stage 
of public debate to the “invisible vision” of knowledge written in the soul. I read this 
metaphorical transformation of writing as sustaining the power of literacy while 
warning against the limitations and drawbacks of written texts as such. Rather 
than a division between writing and something altogether different, we may have 
here a distinction between written texts and literate knowledge, which I think is 
shown in Phaedrus 276a: The written word is an image (eidōlon) of the true word 
(logos), the “living and breathing word” characterized as “knowledge written in 
the soul of the learner” (epistēmēs graphetai en tē tou manthanontas psuchē). 
The true word is called the “legitimate brother” of the “bastard” written word (the 
word apart from its father/author) and as having a “more powerful nature.” The 
distinction here between (written) image and genuine (written) reality suggests 
that “writing in the soul” is not merely a metaphor, but, as I would put it, an irreduc-
ible metaphor that embodies the distinction between written words as such and 
the power of literacy in its intellectual effects and capacities for new discoveries.
Within this story of philosophical writing there is shown the specter of 
philosophy’s Other, the phono-ecstatics of original orality, which we literates have 
lost, and which cannot be called “phono-centric” because no “center” is given in 
a life that is no more than world-disclosive transactional speech acts passing in 
time and preserved only through the fragile power of memory. Yet even in a literate 
culture, a modifi ed orality persists as the disclosive life of social speech practice, 
which precedes and haunts refl ection, and which the fi rst great philosophical 
writer wrestled with in dialogues that both reformed primary orality and warned 
against the “dead letters” of philosophical texts.26
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NOTES
1. Among several important studies in this vein, see two works by John Sallis: Being 
and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, 3rd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996); and Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999). See also Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the 
Platonic Dialogues (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).
2. See my discussion of tragic poetry in Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths (Chi-
cago: Open Court, 1990), chap. 5.
3. The internal virtue of justice is defended by Socrates against Thrasymachus and the 
cynical implications of the Gyges myth (Books 1–2). The long digression about the 
polis is meant to clarify the picture of a just soul and its advantages, and the digres-
sion unfolds to meet the daunting task posed to Socrates in Book 2: Prove not only 
that the just man is worthy but happier than the unjust man, that he will fl ourish 
in some way—and this in terms of the toughest case imaginable, pitting the unjust 
man thought by everyone to be just against the just man thought by everyone to 
be unjust (361). This task is reiterated as the purpose of the entire conversation in 
Book 10 (612). And the rectifi cation myth of Er (616–18) performs the climax of 
Socrates’ project. Immortality serves an essential function in overcoming the limits 
on rationality and justice in earthly life. Homer’s depiction of Odysseus is in many 
ways a stark contrast to Platonic hopes. He is a heterogeneous character, called polu-
tropos, a man of “many ways” (Odyssey I, 1), and his capacity for deceptive cunning 
(mētis) is frequently celebrated (XIII, 295ff.). And most notably, Odysseus turns down 
Calypso’s offer of immortality (V, 203ff.), preferring his homecoming that includes old 
age and death. Indeed, the opening of the story (I, 59) tells us that Odysseus “yearns 
to die” (thaneein himeretai). And it should be noted that Odysseus makes his choice 
after having witnessed the grim reality of Hades described in Book XI. Given this 
picture of heroic fi nitude, it is telling that the myth of Er has Odysseus recanting his 
Homeric persona, choosing for his next embodiment the quiet, unaccomplished life 
of a private individual (Republic 620C).
4. See Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 1–33; and Raymond A. Prier, Thauma Idesthai (Gainesville: Florida State 
University Press, 1989), 169–79.
5. In the Ion (533), the power (dunamis) of poetry is depicted as a chain of magnetic 
rings, which transmit a compelling force of attraction from the Muses to poets to 
audiences.
6. It should be noted that epic poetry itself recognized the enchanting power of poetic 
speech (e.g., Iliad IX.186–89 and Odyssey XI.334); and its danger for mortals was 
vividly portrayed in the episode of the Sirens (Odyssey XII), whose song brings death 
rather than life by causing men to forget their vital tasks. The Sirens can be seen to 
embody the sheer static power of poetic enchantment without its role of engender-
ing memory. The Sirens, then, are a demonic divergence from the Muses and their 
cultural function of establishing and sustaining stories for future appropriations 
of a memorable past (cf. Iliad VI.357–58). See Charles Segal, Singers, Heroes, and 
Gods in the Odyssey (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 100ff. The central 
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problem of mimetic identifi cation is that critical refl ection is incommensurate with 
the “captivating” language of poetry. Any refl ective stance would ruin the force of 
poetic communication. The hymns and songs permitted in the Republic are ethi-
cally benefi cial, and so their mimetic effects are worthy and need not be subjected 
to critical refl ection.
7. In recent years there has been an enormous amount of scholarship on the question 
of orality and literacy, and particularly in the context of ancient Greek culture. For 
some representative studies, see two works by Eric A. Havelock: Preface to Plato 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) and The Muse Learns to Write 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Kevin Robb, Literacy and Paideia in 
Ancient Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Rosalind Thomas, Literacy 
and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Harvey 
Yunis, ed., Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). Greece has the distinction of being a special laboratory case, because 
it developed the intellectual vocabulary of literacy that served to shape succeeding 
cultures, and this development occurred internal to a society that was originally oral 
and that experienced fi rst hand the tensions and transitions attaching to the emer-
gence of literacy out on oral background. See Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write, 
chap. 9. An important precedent for my analysis is P. Christopher Smith, “Orality and 
Writing: Plato’s Phaedrus and the Pharmakon Revisited,” in Between Philosophy and 
Poetry: Writing Rhythm History, ed. Massimo Verdiccio and Robert Burch (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), 73–89.
8. I will focus on only a few areas that can fi t my purposes in this essay; and in this brief 
discussion I am forced to simplify distinctions that in reality exhibit much overlap-
ping complexity.
9. In Homer, for example, poetry is presumed to convey knowledge and truth together 
with emotional pleasure (Iliad II.484–58; IX.186–89; Odyssey XII.188).
10. Perhaps the fi rst reference to a written text as an organic whole is found in the Phrae-
drus 264c.
11. See Kevin Robb, ed., Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy (La Salle, Ill.: 
Monist Library of Philosophy, 1983).
12. See Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1960), chap. 10.
13. See Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write, 111. When I pose typical philosophical ques-
tions in class—say, What is courage?—if students have any initial mental image, 
is it likely to be the graphic word “courage,” even if I don’t write it on the board? In 
preliterate Greece, if courage were being considered it would likely involve scenes of 
action informed by traditional poetic stories about heroic exemplars. A sensuous eidos 
can provide an analogical reference for philosophical refl ection (as with examples 
of craft) but it cannot fully suffi ce. Writing may also permit the transformation of 
ordinary Greek words into technical terms because of the abstract difference between 
script and spoken uses. An example is ousia as “property” and “being” (the beginning 
of the Meno shows both senses deployed).
Orality, Literacy, and Plato’s Critique of Poetry 331
14. The setting at the start of the Theaetetus is rich with a remarkable ambiguity: Euclides 
wrote down the logos of a conversation, which is then read aloud to the group—so 
here we have a written dialogue portraying a conversation that turns to the read-
ing/reciting of a written text that recorded a dialogical conversation (whew!).
15. Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, 232. The Protagoras, presumably earlier 
than the Republic, mentions the learning of letters in education (325c ff.).
16. See Jesper Svenbro, “The Interior Voice: On the Invention of Silent Reading,” in Nothing 
to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context, eds. John J. Winkler and 
Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 366–84. Svenbro 
also discusses scriptio continua, the absence of word spacing in Greek written texts, 
which shows that books were intended primarily for oral recitation (because here 
the ear would pick up word differentiation more than the eye). Even silent reading 
can occupy a grey zone of “hearing with the eyes.” This complicates my suggestion 
that written words created new visual objects that aided abstraction and refl ection. 
Nevertheless, learning to write—by fi rst learning letters and then writing words 
down—can serve my analysis, because the learning and the act of writing must 
involve piecemeal attention to the different words; and presumably people did not 
vocalize letters and words when writing them out. So despite the oral use of books in 
the Academy, there remains a way to speak of silent visual attention to words, which 
could square with Plato’s depiction of a silent comprehension of the logos associated 
with writing (in the Philebus and Theaetetus). Incidentally, in the Phaedo 97c, Socrates 
tells of having heard a recitation of a book by Anaxagoras, and then eagerly attaining 
a copy and rapidly reading it himself (presumably in silence).
17. In the Meno, just before the instruction of the slave boy, Socrates discusses the graphic 
example of a geometrical fi gure (schēma), defi ned as the limit (peras) of a solid (76a). 
Before he talks with the boy, Socrates asks if he speaks Greek, and he then draws a square 
fi gure in the sand (82b). The boy’s diffi culty with the problem of doubling the fi gure’s area 
is that he merely supposes (oietai) the answer by doubling the sides (82e). Socrates tells 
him to visually point out the line rather than “reckon” (arithmein) the answer. Socrates 
then draws the diagonal line (grammē) that will show the boy the answer.
18. See my analysis in Myth and Philosophy, 72–88.
19. In On the Soul, Aristotle uses the same metaphor. In the account of nous as the potential 
for thinking forms, Aristotle says that what is potentially in the mind is “in the same 
way that letters are on a tablet that bears no actual writing; this is just what happens 
in the mind” (430a1–2). Then after including the soul in processes of making akin 
to technē forming matter, Aristotle says that the soul is both a receptive “becoming 
all things” and an active “making all things” (430a10); and that the soul is like a hand 
in being an instrument (organon) that employs instruments: nous is a form (eidos) 
that employs forms (eidōn) (432a1). So the mind both receives intelligible forms 
without sensible matter (429a15) and activates intelligible form, and this twofold 
process is compared with technē (430a13). Would it be too much a stretch to detect 
here a tacit reference to the receptive and active techniques of reading and writing?
20. Plato’s point about question and answer presumably refl ects a pedagogical program: 
“Why do you believe X?” not only prepares the defense of beliefs but the teaching of 
knowledge by way of personal discovery. But it would be wrong to think that earlier 
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poetic forms were barren of pedagogical intent and effects. The exemplary function of 
narrative accounts of the deeds and dispositions of heroic fi gures surely entails a teach-
ing program: “How does one do X?” is just as much an instruction as “What is X?”
21. For discussions of the shifts from oral to written practices pertaining to cultural 
education, see Jesper Svenbro, Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient 
Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 9; and 
Jennifer Wise, Dionysus Writes: The Invention of Theater in Ancient Greece (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 1.
22. Smith notes and discusses how literacy functions in the background of this judg-
ment: At 264c, the organic order of a speech is needful of a “bodily” structure that is 
written out (gegrammena) in order to delineate proper relationships. Also, in Philebus 
18b–d, Theuth reappears as the one who distinguishes and organizes the forms of 
vocal elements into a system of their combinations and differences; such structure 
must involve a passage from sonic elements to graphic letters, because the knowl-
edge involved is called technē grammatikē and its possessor is called a grammatikos 
(“Orality and Writing,” 79–80, 85–86).
23. The soul’s inward possession of knowledge seems essential to counteract the con-
ditioning power of poetry, where the effects of poetic mimēsis settle into the very 
nature of a person, in body, speech, and thought (Republic 395).
24. See Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, 235ff. According to Robb, Aristotle’s 
Lyceum was the fi rst recognizable school dedicated to reading, analyzing, amassing, and 
composing written texts; the Academy was in transition from an oral to a literate focus. In 
the Laws (811d–e), after traditional poetry and texts are deemed harmful for education, 
the kind of discussions presently conducted—and “all our other (like) discourses”—are 
deemed worthy and should be written down for instructional purposes.
25. This point is clarifi ed in the discussion of the graphic image of a circle, which has 
physical features that confl ict with the true meaning of the idea (it can be “rubbed 
out” and it “everywhere touches a straight line” in likewise being composed of “points” 
and so it is mixed with an opposite nature).
26. I have deliberately left out a discussion of Derrida’s work on this topic, postponing it 
for a time until I have sorted out what I want to draw from the Greek material, before 
addressing Derrida’s important and infl uential treatments (always a daunting task for 
me, I confess). Smith’s essay, “Orality and Writing,” is right, I think, in showing how 
the kind of analysis advanced in my study would call for a revision of Derrida’s claims 
about Plato’s apparent displacement of writing on behalf of a grounding “voice.”
